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Political risk management during instability
Published in Stephen O. Ogunlana, Prasanta Kumar Dey, Risk Management in Engineering and Construction, 2019
The case selection process adheres to several criteria: (i) they are general members of the Bangladesh Garments Manufacturing and Exporters Association (BGMEA) or Bangladesh Knitwear Manufacturers and Exporters Association (BKMEA); (ii) they are a first tier supplier of multinational fashion brands; (ii) they have been in the business for ten years or more to have gone through some degree of political instability; and (iv) they employ more than 500 people (Table 22.2). Smaller manufacturers, mainly order manufacturers, that did not fulfil these criteria are excluded since they sit in the second or third tier in the local supply chain. Their exposure to political risk is primarily through their buyers. It was also identified at the sample selection stage that their understanding and awareness of the political risk would not add significant value to the study. The qualitative evidence gathered from the trade association facilitates the triangulation exercise as they hold significant collective bargaining power in the political decision-making process in Bangladesh. Beside semi-structured interviews of 20 participants from four organisations conducted during 2015–17, the author has visited several factories and attended the Bangladesh Apparel & Textile Exposition (BATEXPO) in 2017 to collect a combination of rich and thick primary and secondary data.
Introduction
Published in Madeline Taylor, Tina Hunter, Agricultural Land Use and Natural Gas Extraction Conflicts, 2018
The insights provided by this book have potential relevance to future policy and legal practice in the agricultural and energy sectors throughout the chosen jurisdictions and globally. This work argues that coexistence requires a new approach to governance, reflected in collectivism and collective bargaining, in order to recognise the interests of private agricultural landholders in a sustainable and equitable way during and after unconventional gas activities. Arguably, the most pressing challenge facing resource-rich nations is how to plan for a future that is economically productive, preserves agricultural land and its future food production. This, in turn, equates to the need for regulation that reflects this recent shift in priorities from mining to preserve agriculture sustainably. This book explores the creation and adoption of a novel legal vehicle, collective bargaining, to increase the bargaining power of rural landholders during unconventional gas activities. Currently, no global socio-legal academic study has performed a legal analysis of the potential of collective bargaining for agricultural landholders and unconventional gas titleholders. Consequently, this book will fill a current gap in the literature by focusing on the application of new theories in an unconventional gas context: adaptive management, precautionary principle and a statist approach.
The Fukushima Accident
Published in Jennifer F. Sklarew, Building Resilient Energy Systems, 2023
The Fukushima disaster weakened the electric utilities’ collective bargaining power with the government in several other ways. Some electric utility interviewees cited the loss of TEPCO’s leadership as the reason for the utilities’ diminished access to and leverage over METI, After the March 11 disaster, the government partially nationalized TEPCO, formerly Japan’s most influential electric utility. KEPCO’s ascension to the leadership role in FEPC compounded this problem, since KEPCO lacks TEPCO’s government connections and diplomacy skills, according to several interviewees. I1 summarized the problems facing the electric utilities: “the question is now raised if Kansai can be a leader of the ten utilities or not, where the interests, the stakes are so different from company to company … currently Kansai is the leader of the electricity industry, and historically, they do not have good access to METI. And historically they are not accustomed to being a leader. And also they are in a very unique position to have a priority on nuclear power” (July 2013). I1 predicted that “if the utilities are not in agreement, they do not present some unified request.” These challenges may signal the end of the electric utilities’ unified front on nuclear power promotion and the future of Japanese energy policy, according to I1 and other electric utility interviewees. This breach in cooperation among the utilities has implications for broader collaboration with policymakers and regulators on energy system resilience, as individual utilities focus on their disparate economic resilience goals, rather than overall system resilience.
Social life cycle performance of additive manufacturing in the healthcare industry: the orthosis and prosthesis cases
Published in International Journal of Computer Integrated Manufacturing, 2021
Bruno Soares, Inês Ribeiro, Gonçalo Cardeal, Marco Leite, Helena Carvalho, Paulo Peças
This paper presents a novel S-LCA of AM manufactured medical devices, using two real case studies from the health industry. Results allowed a visual mapping of the trade-offs in social sustainability of the adoption of AM in medical devices. The results show that AM is socially sustainable due to several factors. These factors include a positive impact on local-specialized jobs, general technological and economic development. Improvements into the social impacts of the stakeholders belong to ‘local community’ and ‘Society’ were also observed. On the other hand, there may be a loss in ‘Collective bargaining power’, and difficulties in assuring the ‘Respect for intellectual property rights’ . Nevertheless, there was an increase in adoption and continued use of the medical devices by the patients, resulting in a faster re-integration in society.
Financial ripple effect in complex adaptive supply networks: an agent-based model
Published in International Journal of Production Research, 2023
Yaniv Proselkov, Jie Zhang, Liming Xu, Erik Hofmann, Thomas Y. Choi, Dale Rogers, Alexandra Brintrup
Firms in a supply network are not always equals when dealing with eachother, such that one actor in any buyer-supplier dyad may control the relationship more and have more influence than its competitors. This may be due to being a key supplier, the market-dominant brand, or having more market share. Key suppliers are nonexistent in our model since it has homogeneous material flow. We, therefore, let bargaining power be an independent parameter, corresponding to market share and access to financing, assuming that greater bargaining power suggests greater ease in negotiating bank mandates. This assumption is used to investigate the effect of varying market share for a given power position in an isolated manner.
Coordinating supply chains with uncertain production cost by incomplete contracts
Published in International Journal of Production Research, 2022
Shouting Zhao, Juliang Zhang, T. C. E. Cheng
Following Tirole (1999), Hart and Moore (1999), and Plambeck and Taylor (2007b), we use Nash bargaining to model the re-negotiation process. In our model, the retailer and the manufacturer bargain on the new wholesale price and order quantity to maximise their profits in the re-negotiation stage. Suppose that the retailer’s bargaining power is and the manufacturer’s bargaining power is . Then, the re-negotiation process can be modelled as follows where and are the retailer’s and manufacturer’s profits, respectively, if they do not re-negotiate, which are also called the disagreement values in Nash bargaining. It is noted that the retailer’s and manufacturer’s profits without re-negotiation are By solving (3), we can obtain that The optimal re-negotiated wholesale price depends on the original wholesale price, order quantity, and production capacity. This implies that the terms specified in the contract ex ante have an impact on the new contract terms after re-negotiation. The optimal re-negotiated order quantity is independent of the original wholesale price and order quantity, and reaches ex post efficiency. We analyse the optimal re-negotiated wholesale price and order quantity in detail after we derive the optimal wholesale price and order quantity ex ante.