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Collective Bargaining and the Impact on the Safety Function
Published in Thomas D. Schneid, Shelby L. Schneid, Human Resources and Change Management for Safety Professionals, 2019
Thomas D. Schneid, Shelby L. Schneid
The collective bargaining process usually involved four (4) basic steps; namely, the initiation of the actual bargaining, the establishment of the rapport between the negotiators, the negotiation and consolidation of the proposals, and the completion of bargaining and consolidation of the agreements into the collective bargaining contract. The safety and health professional, no matter whether he/she is seated at the negotiating table or working behind the scenes, is an instrumental member of most negotiating teams. Safety and health professionals should be well prepared at all times and be ready at a moment’s notice to produce information to support any safety-related proposals or counterproposals. Safety and health professionals should also be aware that the negotiating process can be a grueling and time-consuming process often stretching for weeks or even months. The location of the negotiation sessions is often at locations away from the operations, thus, safety and health professionals actively involved as part of the negotiating team should remember to make appropriate arrangement within the company or organization to fulfill the required duties and responsibilities in the safety and health professional’s absence.
Working across Boundaries: Creating Value and Producing Safety in Health Care Using Empathic Negotiation Skills
Published in Jeffrey Braithwaite, Erik Hollnagel, Garth S Hunte, Working Across Boundaries, 2019
Andrew Johnson, Paul Lane, Michael Klug, Robyn Clay-Williams
Negotiation is a process whereby two or more people resolve or navigate through their differences when there is ambiguity as to the correct outcome. Interest-Based Bargaining (IBB) is a form of negotiation where parties resolve differences by understanding and aligning the interests of the other party to their own. At the core of negotiation theory is the differentiation between integrative (interest-based) bargaining and distributive bargaining. This creates the possibility of creating, rather than merely distributing value for the parties, the classic win-win solution.
Procurement
Published in Paul Myerson, Lean Demand-Driven Procurement, 2018
In distributive bargaining, the goals of one party are in fundamental, direct conflict with another party, resources are fixed and limited, and maximizing one’s own share of the resources is the goal for both parties. So, in this case, there is usually a “winner” and a “loser.”
The combined effect of marginal social and private benefit on the socially optimal equity structure of PPP projects
Published in Construction Management and Economics, 2021
Binmore et al. (1986) introduced the asymmetric bargaining power of bargaining parties into the Nash bargaining model. The sources of asymmetry in bargaining power include time preferences, disagreement points, bargaining procedure and the parties’ beliefs regarding specific environmental determinants. Conversely, from a resource dependence theory perspective, bargaining power can be considered as being related to critical resources, that is, the manufacturing processes, advanced technologies, knowledge of marketing expertise and financial capital, owned by the bargaining party (Argyres and Liebeskind 1999, Crook and Combs 2007). In other words, the party with the most critical resources holds the highest bargaining power. In the Nash bargaining model, if the bargaining power of player i (i = A, B) is the asymmetric Nash solution is characterized by the maximization problem
Outcomes of supply chain dependence asymmetry: a systematic review of the statistical evidence
Published in International Journal of Production Research, 2021
Given the nature of the world, practitioners should be familiar with both distributive and integrative bargaining. Going forward, more attention should be given to how parties can move from a distributive to an integrative negotiation posture. If the stronger firm takes a competitive stance, the weaker firm can try to develop other relationships and possibly other products to lessen the dependency on this relationship (Lewicki, Saunders, and Barry 2021). Some have argued greater trust must be built slowly via progressively adopting incremental collaborative practices (Ma, Pal, and Gustafsson 2019). While cultures undoubtedly differ, some Japanese executives have developed greater trust more rapidly at social events outside of the formal negotiation processes, such as over drinks, a meal or golf (Meyer 2014, 187–9). Qualitative research on such matters is clearly warranted.
Computing the Nash Bargaining Solution for Multiple Players in Discrete-Time Markov Chains Games
Published in Cybernetics and Systems, 2020
Kristal K. Trejo, Julio B. Clempner, Alexander S. Poznyak
Applications for bargaining situations beyond economic models, the latest applications take place also in the communications area where some problems are formulated as a two-person bargaining problem. For example, Zhang et al. (2008) proposed a cooperation strategy among rational nodes in a wireless cooperative relaying network as a effort to solve two basic problems, when to cooperate and how to cooperate. Another example is proposed by Han, Ji, and Liu (2005) where a fair scheme to allocate subcarrier, rate, and power for multiuser orthogonal frequency-division multiple-access systems is proposed. The problem here was to maximize the overall system rate, under each user’s maximal power and minimal rate constraints, while considering the fairness among users. This approach considers a new fairness criterion, which is a generalized proportional fairness based on Nash bargaining solutions and coalitions. On the other hand, Birkeland and Tungodden (2014) studied the role of fairness motivation in bargaining, showing that the bargaining outcome is sensitive to the fairness motivation of the two individuals, unless they both consider an equal division fair. A bargaining between two strongly fairness motivated individuals who have different views about what represents a fair division may end in disagreement.