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7 Maintaining Video Quality and Security
Published in Wes Simpson, Howard Greenfield, IPTV and Internet Video:, 2012
Wes Simpson, Howard Greenfield
One traditional form of key distribution for STBs is the smart card. These cards are called “smart” because they incorporate a processor and memory that can be used by a variety of applications. Billions of smart cards are sold around the world each year for a variety of uses, including identification cards, mass-transit fare tickets, prepaid telephone cards (outside the United States), debit/credit cards, and a host of other applications. Typically, a smart card contains a processor capable of performing basic calculations and executing simple programs, as well as memory that can hold both variable and permanent data.
11 Drm, Content Ownership, and Content Security
Published in Wes Simpson, Video Over IP, 2013
One of the most common ways of distributing keys used for secure video transport is the smart card. These cards are called “smart” because they incorporate a processor and memory that can be used by a variety of applications. Billions of smart cards are sold around the world each year for a variety of uses, including identification cards, prepaid telephone cards (outside the United States), debit/credit cards, and a host of other applications. Typically, a smart card contains both a processor capable of performing basic calculations and executing simple programs and memory that can hold both variable and permanent data.
How Information Technology Is Changing E-business on the Way to the Digital Economy
Published in Anna Brzozowska, Dagmara Bubel, Larysa Nekrasenko, Organisation Management in the Digital Economy, 2022
Anna Brzozowska, Dagmara Bubel, Larysa Nekrasenko
Smart card: The technological pinnacle of the e-money is systems based on smart card technology. A smart card is a small computer with its processor, memory, software, and information input/output system. The smart card is used as a regular debit card, called an electronic wallet, which records the information about the withdrawal of money and information about the customer. E-money based on smart cards can provide the necessary level of confidentiality and anonymity. Also, they work in offline mode and do not require communication with the centre to confirm payment.
Machine learning techniques to predict sensitive patterns to fault attack in the Java Card application
Published in Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 2018
Yahiaoui Chahrazed, Lanet Jean-Louis, Mezghiche Mohamed, Tamine Karim
Lately, the use of smart card has grown enormously in different application domains, such as banking, identity and passport or telephony because it provides a secure environment for data and programs in a very small device. Its security relies on hardware and software mechanisms. In the first category, we find specific sensors burned into the chip and covered by a resin used to disable the card when it is physically attacked. The second security barrier is the software. The embedded programs are usually designed neither for returning nor modifying sensitive information without the guaranty that the operation is authorised. Unfortunately, these cards are highly sensitive to various types of attacks among which fault attacks represent the most serious threat. The principle of a fault attack is to modify the physical environment of the card in order to provoke an abnormal behaviour of the component. It can target either the processor, the data/address bus or even the memory cells. Such physical perturbation can be caused by various tools such as a laser beam or a glitch generator. Fault attacks have been mainly applied in the literature to the implementation of cryptographic algorithms (Moulin, Bihame, & Shamir, 1997). Nevertheless, such attacks may have an impact on the whole software embedded on the card.
Advanced multi-factor user authentication scheme for E-governance applications in smart cities
Published in International Journal of Computers and Applications, 2019
The transition to E-governance has totally become dependable on the security and authenticity of the information and is vulnerable to interceptions and alterations caused by the attackers. User authentication is of utmost importance for successful implementation of E-governance applications in the smart cities. User authentication is an essential requirement in providing security and privacy of data. Authentication is the process of confirming the identity of the remote user on the web before granting access to a resource. Secure user authentication schemes must be employed to control any malevolent user from using the services. The sensitive information of the government must be made available to legitimate users only. This paper proposes a lightweight smart card based user authentication scheme for E-governance applications. Smart cards are extensively employed in e-commerce applications for remote user authentication because of its effectiveness, cheap cost and portability. The user authentication scheme employing smart card is one of the simplest and most convenient authentication techniques for managing confidential data of user in an insecure network. Smart card-based E-governance is commonly employed in-social security cards, income tax cards, Public Distribution System (PDS), election cards. The proposed authentication scheme is lightweight as it employs the XOR and the hash function. The scheme meets all security attributes such as user anonymity, mutual authentication, resistance to denial of service attacks, session key agreement, resistance to replay attacks, resistance to user impersonation attacks, and resistance to offline password guessing attacks. The scheme employs timestamp in order to avert replay attacks.
A randomised scheme for secured modular exponentiation against power analysis attacks
Published in Cyber-Physical Systems, 2019
Moushumi Barman, Hridoy Jyoti Mahanta
The power analysis attacks can efficiently reveal the secrets of smart cards. Smart cards are vulnerable to reverse engineering that makes sense of using chip testing techniques [3,4]. Smart cards are cryptographic devices that contain a single chip mounted below noticeable contacts, and they are regularly constructed based on application-specific integrated circuit (ASIC). The accurate time and power consumption that require definite encryption and decryption operations are measured by DPA. Generally, smart cards are made up of CMOS circuits, for which the power consumption depends strongly on the processed data [5,6]. An output signal of CMOS cell can basically execute one transition out of any four at a particular time. During 0–0 and 1–1 output transition, no energy is used, thus leakage currents are neglected, and in the 0–1 and 1–0, the energy stored is dissolute, thus leakage currents are possible. 0–0 and 1–1 output transitions are static power consumption, and 0–1 and 1–0 output transitions are dynamic power consumption. The power analysis attack depends on operation and data components of power traces [1]. and are referred as the operation-dependent and data-dependent component of the point for a single power trace, respectively. Each power trace also depends on electronic noise component of the power consumption denoted as , and the constant component is denoted as caused by two factors that is leakage current and switching of transistor that happens independently of the data processed and operation performed. Thus, each power trace is the summation of four components as shown below: