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A Critical Analysis of Cyber Threats and Their Global Impact
Published in Suhel Ahmad Khan, Rajeev Kumar, Omprakash Kaiwartya, Mohammad Faisal, Raees Ahmad Khan, Computational Intelligent Security in Wireless Communications, 2022
Syed Adnan Afaq, Mohd. Shahid Husain, Almustapha Bello, Halima Sadia
We often use Wi-Fi with any credential and encryption method, such as WPA2, WPA, or Wi-Fi Protected Setup (WPS). Initially, hackers used brute force, DoS attack, or several WPS pins on a WPS-configured router to exploit Wi-Fi. However, because Wi-Fi encryption techniques and firmware must be updated, exploiting Wi-Fi with this type of attack takes a long time and is dangerous. Recently, a security researcher discovered a way to exploit Wi-Fi and access the Wi-Fi password without having to try many passwords or using brute force cracking.
Brief History of Wi-Fi
Published in Ali Youssef, Douglas McDonald II, Jon Linton, Bob Zemke, Aaron Earle, Wi-Fi Enabled Healthcare, 2014
Ali Youssef, Douglas McDonald II, Jon Linton, Bob Zemke, Aaron Earle
Wi-Fi Protected Setup™: facilitates easy set-up of security features using a Personal Identification Number (PIN) or other defined methods within the Wi-Fi device. Wi-Fi Protected Setup certifies products that implement technology defined in the Wi-Fi Simple Configuration Technical Specification.
Device-to-Device Communications Technologies
Published in Yufeng Wang, Athanasios V. Vasilakos, Qun Jin, Hongbo Zhu, Device-to-Device based Proximity Service, 2017
Yufeng Wang, Athanasios V. Vasilakos, Qun Jin, Hongbo Zhu
Standard—In this case the P2P devices have to first discover each other, and then negotiate which device will act as P2P GO. Wi-Fi Direct devices usually start by performing a traditional Wi-Fi scan (active or passive), by means of which they can discover existent P2P groups and Wi-Fi networks. After this scan, a discovery algorithm is executed. Specifically, a P2P device selects one of the so-called social channels, namely channels 1, 6, or 11 in the 2.4 GHz band, as its listen channel. Then, it alternates between two states: a search state, in which the device performs active scanning by sending probe requests in each of the social channels; and a listen state, in which the device listens for probe requests in its listen channel to respond with probe responses. The amount of time that a P2P device spends on each state is randomly distributed, typically between 100 ms and 300 ms, but it is up to each implementation to decide on the actual mechanism to, for example, trade-off discovery time with energy savings by interleaving sleeping cycles in the discovery process. An example operation of this discovery algorithm is illustrated in Figure 1.3. Once the two P2P devices have found each other, they start the GO negotiation phase. This is implemented using a three-way handshake, namely GO negotiation request/response/confirmation, whereby the two devices agree on which device will act as P2P GO, and on the channel where the group will operate, which can be in the 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz bands. In order to agree on the device that will act as P2P GO, P2P devices send a numerical parameter, the GO intent value, within the three-way handshake, and the device declaring the highest value becomes the P2P GO. To prevent conflicts when two devices declare the same GO intent, a tiebreaker bit is included in the GO negotiation request, which is randomly set every time a GO negotiation request is sent. Once the devices have discovered each other and agreed on the respective roles, the next phase is the establishment of a secure communication using Wi-Fi protected setup, which we denote as WPS provisioning phase and described later, and finally a dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) exchange to set up the IP configuration (the address configuration phase in Figure 1.3).
Policy-based security for distributed manufacturing execution systems
Published in International Journal of Computer Integrated Manufacturing, 2018
Octavian Morariu, Cristina Morariu, Theodor Borangiu
Wired Equivalent Privacy (WEP) encryption was designed to protect against casual snooping but it is not considered secure as explained in Boland and Mousavi (2004) and Reddy et al. (2010). Tools such as AirSnort or Aircrack-ng can quickly determine WEP encryption keys. As a response to security concerns of WEP, Wi-Fi Protected Access (WPA) was introduced. Even if WEP is more secured then WPA, it still has known vulnerabilities. WPA2 is using Advanced Encryption Standard and eliminates some of the vulnerabilities of WEP. However, Wi-Fi Protected Setup which allows initial configuration of the Wi-Fi connection cannot prevent WPA and WPA2 security to be broken in several scenarios. Once the network layer is breached, an attacker will have direct access to the higher layer protocols allowing unauthorised access to information, theft of proprietary information, DoS at the protocol layer and impersonation. Berghel and Uecker (2005) and Aime, Calandriello, and Lioy (2007) point out these security concerns. The higher layer protocols can be secured using secure sockets layer (SSL) that provides encryption, authentication and authorisation of the actors involved using a PKI for certificate management. IEEE 802.11i is a more recent Wi-Fi standard that offers improved security mechanisms like Key Derivation Mechanism, AES, CBC-MAC or AES in CTB. A more recent standard proposition IEEE 802.11ai promises a fast initial link set-up function. This would allow a wireless LAN client to achieve a secure link within 100 ms. At this point, there are no commercial implementation available.