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Establishing the Risk Status of the Corporate Infrastructure
Published in Dan Shoemaker, Anne Kohnke, Ken Sigler, How to Build a Cyber-Resilient Organization, 2018
Shoemaker Dan, Kohnke Anne, Sigler Ken
A library of known cyberattacks is another helpful resource in threat modeling. A Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC), managed by the MITRE Corporation, was established by the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (USCERT) at the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). The objective of the CAPEC effort is to provide a publicly available community resource for identifying and understanding attack patterns generated from in-depth analysis of specific real-world exploit examples and solutions (CAPEC, 2018). The site includes a catalog of common attack patterns and comprehensive schema for distributing and sharing information about them. Attack patterns are a useful tool to build cyber-enabled capabilities that can be effectively used to communicate common ideas with others. They, along with security requirements, misuse/abuse cases, attack trees, and knowledge of common weaknesses and vulnerabilities are all parts of an overall formal threat model. A sample threat model is provided at the end of this chapter.
Design and Development (A4): SDL Activities and Best Practices
Published in James F. Ransome, Anmol, Mark S. Merkow, Practical Core Software Security, 2023
James F. Ransome, Anmol, Mark S. Merkow
Security code review is most successful if it is planned and executed in the context of other security-related efforts such as threat modeling, as described in the previous chapter. Threat modeling helps to identify a critical area of code that then becomes a subject of detailed review, and its results can likewise be used to validate or question security assumptions specified in a threat model and help to understand the application’s functionality, technical design, and existing security threats and countermeasures. A security code review should begin with a review of the threat models and design specifications, then move on to source code.
DREAMS Architectural Style
Published in Hamidreza Ahmadian, Roman Obermaisser, Jon Perez, Distributed Real-Time Architecture for Mixed-Criticality Systems, 2018
R. Obermaisser, M. Abuteir, H. Ahmadian, P. Balbastre, S. Barner, M. Coppola, J. Coronel, A. Crespo, P. Balbastre, G. Fohler, G. Gala, M. Grammatikakis, A. Larrucea Ortube, T. Koller, Z. Owda, D. Weber
A threat model describes and analyzes the security risks associated with the system. It identifies potential threats to the system as well as the vulnerabilities in the system which can be exploited. There are four important questions, which have to be considered while creating a threat model [59]:Who is the attacker? There are two general types of attacker, a user and an application. Each one of them could be authorized or unauthorized to access a certain component. It is not always necessary to distinguish the attackers as users and/or applications. Considering attacks on the network layer (OSI Layer 3), the attacks are independent of the application layer (OSI layer 7). Hence, in the threat model for communication services, only the “internal” and “external” attackers are considered.What is attacked? A system has different parts which could be attacked. These parts of the system are components and applications.Where is the attacker? An attacker can attack a system from different locations. The attacker could be inside the system or he can attack the system from outside.How is the attack performed? The attacker has different capabilities to perform an attack. Depending on the questions “Who is the attacker?”, “What is attacked?” and “Where is the attacker?”, the attacker has various options to realize an attack.
Secure and Memorable Authentication Using Dynamic Combinations of 3D Objects in Virtual Reality
Published in International Journal of Human–Computer Interaction, 2023
Jiawei Wang, BoYu Gao, Huawei Tu, Hai-Ning Liang, Zitao Liu, Weiqi Luo, Jian Weng
The designs of the threat model are vital to evaluate a system’s security. For observation attacks against VR authentication, not only common shoulder surfing attacks need to be considered in the threat model, but newly discovered attack types (eg, MITR attacks as presented in (Casey et al., 2019)) have to be incorporated into the threats model design. In light of our security study, we highly encourage researchers conducting research on authentication to consider MITR threats as presented in this work to increase the validity of security systems.