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Security Challenges and Solutions in IoT Networks for the Smart Cities
Published in Mohammad Ayoub Khan, Internet of Things, 2022
Side Channel Attacks: in a side channel attack, the adversary makes use of physical implementation information such as timing data, power consumption, electromagnetic leaks or even sounds which can be used to exploit the device further. Most of these attacks are based on statistical approaches but could also require more technical information such as knowledge of the operating system. A notable example of a side channel attack in IoT includes the attacker using the sound a 3D printer emits when creating an object to reconstruct the objects at a later stage without the need for their design [41].
An improved differential power analysis against random process interrupts
Published in Journal of the Chinese Institute of Engineers, 2019
Han Gan, Hongxin Zhang, Muhammad Saad Khan, Xueli Wang
The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) (Lu, Dunkelman, and Keller 2008) is a 128-bit block cipher with a variable key length (128-, 192-, and 256-bit keys are supported). AES is widely applied to many security-related applications. However, the security of the cryptographic algorithm is threatened by side-channel attacks. Differential power analysis (DPA) is a kind of side-channel attack. DPA uses the sensitive information contained in the power consumption curves (PCCs) to reveal the secret key (Lumbiarres, Mariano, and Enrique 2016). The attack greatly threatens information security. To defend against the attack, random process interrupts (RPIs) inject dummy operations into the encryption algorithm to misalign the PCCs. The misalignment causes the sensitive information contained in the PCCs to be scattered into multiple positions, which increases the difficulty of the attack. To strengthen the effect of misalignment, signal transformation methods are adopted, such as wavelet transform, fourth-order cumulant, and Fourier transform. The wavelet transform (Muijrers, Woudenberg, and Batina 2011) method is intended to reconstruct the signals for resynchronization of the PCC information. The fourth-order cumulant, proposed by Shiple (Shiple, Ashour, and Ammar 2013), is used to remove Gaussian noise from the signals. The methods of a-law and u-law methods (Ryoo et al. (2008), considered companding methods, are intended to surmount the noise problem. An energy-based DPA attack (E-DPA) (Le et al. (2007) (Clavier, Coron, and Dabbous 2000) involves integrating the values of the PCCs over several consecutive cycles so that the key can be revealed by the misaligned curves.
Exploration for Software Mitigation to Spectre Attacks of Poisoning Indirect Branches
Published in IETE Technical Review, 2018
Baozi Chen, Qingbo Wu, Yusong Tan, Liu Yang, Peng Zou
Side-channel information is the information that can be obtained from the physical states of a system rather than the plaintext of information itself. A side-channel attack targets to utilize the side-channel information to perform attacks rather than the weakness in the system implementation itself. Depending on the physical characteristics of systems, there are various kinds of side channels which can be used by the adversaries to leak sensitive information. Timing information [11], power consumption [12, 13] and electromagnetic leaks [14] are all sources of information and can be exploited to perform side-channel attacks.
Side channel attack resistant architecture for elliptic curve cryptosystem
Published in Cyber-Physical Systems, 2018
Pravin Zode, Raghavendra Deshmukh
Side channel attacks can be resisted by addition of noise, shielding, modification of algorithm design. We considered countermeasure against both power analysis and timing attacks. In this paper, Side channel attack resistant architecture for ECC is proposed. To resist the side channel attack, System Monitor and Digital Clock Manager are used as IP of device and pseudo noise power generator is designed with low area overhead for concealing the secret information