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Key Management and Protection for IP Multimedia
Published in Borko Furht, Darko Kirovski, Multimedia Encryption and Authentication Techniques and Applications, 2006
Rolf Blom, Elisabetta Carrara, Fredrik Lindholm, Karl Norrman, Mats Näslund
There are other practical reasons why rekeying may be needed. For the currently defined transforms in SRTP, rekeying has to be triggered after at most 248 RTP (or 231 RTCP) packets have been secured. Finally, rekeying may simply be performed for security reasons, such as an unfortunate compromise of the Master key, or simply a conservative security policy that wants to strongly limit the amount of cipher-text under the same Master key. In the end, it is always a matter of policy of the key management protocol when the rekeying is actually triggered.
Key Management and Protection for IP Multimedia
Published in Borko Furht, Darko Kirovski, Multimedia Security Handbook, 2004
Rolf Blom, Elisabetta Carrara, Fredrik Lindholm, Karl Norrman, Näslund Mats
There are other practical reason why rekeying may be needed. For the currently defined transforms in SRTP, rekeying has to be triggered after at most 248 RTP (or 231 RTCP) packets have been secured. Finally, rekeying may simply be performed for security reasons, such as an unfortunate compromise of the Master key, or simply a conservative security policy that wants to strongly limit the amount of ciphertext under the same Master key. In the end, it is always a matter of policy of the key management protocol when the rekeying is actually triggered.
Guarded dual authentication based DRM with resurgence dynamic encryption techniques
Published in Enterprise Information Systems, 2019
Neha Agarwal, Ajay Rana, J.P. Pandey
A single key shared between all group individuals will result in the access to past data onto a recently joining member. The aforementioned circumstance abuses the confidentiality and the principle of least benefit (Mapoka, Shepherd, and Abd-Alhameed 2015). In this manner, in group shared data, insiders may generate the issue of backward access control and forward access control (Spandana and P Sunitha 2016; Choi, Choi, and Lee 2015). The basic solution to rekeying (producing another key, decrypting all data, and re-encrypting with the new key) does not prove to be scalable for frequent changes in the group membership (Hur, Koo, Shin, and Kang 2016).