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Content Delivery Network for Efficient Delivery of Internet Traffic
Published in Hassnaa Moustafa, Sherali Zeadally, Media Networks: Architectures, Applications, and Standards, 2016
Gilles Bertrand, Emile Stéphan
End-users trust CDNs and expect them to deliver valid content. However, attackers might try to replace valid content by malicious one, to take advantage of the large delivery resources of the CDN and to spread viruses or other nonlegitimate content, for free. This kind of attack is called “cache poisoning.”
Blockchain for Cybersecurity: Systematic Literature Review and Classification
Published in Journal of Computer Information Systems, 2022
Marina Liu, William Yeoh, Frank Jiang, Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
The core function of the traditional domain name service is concentrated on the server, which is vulnerable to cache poisoning, DDoS attacks, and DNS hijacking. The combination of blockchain and domain name service is an innovative approach to addressing these security challenges by developing decentralized, secure, and user-friendly naming systems without trusted parties.55 The two popular existing blockchain-based DNS alternatives are Namecoin and Blockstack. Each system node can act as a DNS server, where users can perform domain name registration, transmission, and data revision. The decentralization of domain name services makes it impossible for intruders to manipulate or steal the central record.56 Further, attacks that target servers do not damage the entire blockchain-based DNS.
Multi-classifier and meta-heuristic based cache pollution attacks and interest flooding attacks detection and mitigation model for named data networking
Published in Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 2022
Buvanesvari R., Suresh Joseph K
Data-Named Networking a well-known illustration of CCN is NDN. In NDN, every node (including hosts and routers) is permitted to maintain a local cache that is utilised to satisfy incoming content requests. Because of this, NDN makes a strong architecture for effective large-scale content distribution. However, depending on caching enables an opponent to launch assaults that are both quick and easy to carry out. Both cache poisoning and cache pollution are used in these attacks. Because NDN uses a pull paradigm, content is only pushed into the net in response to a consumers explicit request. The two communication kinds that NDN supports are curiosity and information (Figure 1). Instead of employing IP prefixes, consumers route their interest queries using name prefixes to request content. An interest packet is forwarded based on the location of the source material. The mid-routers and nodes do check whether the requested content is matching with the contents in the cache. If it is, it transmits it to the applicant along with the requests origin path. Meanwhile, all intermediate nodes save copy of the content from replying if the same request is obtained in the future. The existing router in NDN does three main data structures like FIB, PI, and CS. Here, FIB depicts lookup table; PIT includes outstanding entries [arrival interface, interest prefix]. The PIT lookup tables are maintained by each NDN router and contain outstanding [interest, arrival-interfaces] entries. For the sake of efficiency, multiple waiting interest for same material are compressed, the very first interest is delivered, and the returned content is sent back to all incoming interfaces. The creator fills the requirement by introducing content into the system when they are shown interest. Each router along the path removes the PIT entry to satisfy interest. One of the main components of NDN is distributed caching. Every router that delivers content may keep a copy of it in cache in its domestic content store (CS). No specific memory size or caching management system is needed for NDN. According to local information, each router can choose what to cache. NDN is able to carry out expert large-scale content delivery thanks to distributed caching.