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Explaining the Patterns of Breakdown
Published in Sidney Dekker, The Field Guide to Understanding ‘Human Error’, 2017
Continuing an approach against written guidance (particularly when events are considered in hindsight) is a common problem and may well have parallels in other operational worlds. The Flight Safety Foundation sponsored a study in the late 1990s to analyze the factors that play into approach and landing accidents, and concluded in part, predictably, that executing a missed approach is one of the best investments that pilots can make in safety to prevent approach and landing accidents.3Such advice should not be confused with an explanation for why many crews do not do so. In fact, getting crews to execute go-arounds, particularly in cases of unstabilized approaches, remains one of the most vexing problems facing most chief pilots and managers of flight operations across the world. Characterizations such as “press-on-itis” do little to explain why crews press on; such words really only label a very difficult problem differently without offering any deeper understanding.
Reconceptualizing Expertise: Learning from an Expert’s Error
Published in Schraagen Jan Maarten, Laura G. Militello, Tom Ormerod, Lipshitz Raanan, Naturalistic Decision Making and Macrocognition, 2017
Schraagen Jan Maarten, Laura G. Militello, Tom Ormerod, Lipshitz Raanan
The standard criteria for electing a missed approach are the failure to visually acquire the runway or the failure to stabilize the aircraft on the approach. The criteria used by the captain in electing to abort the landing were windspeed cues directly associated with a microburst as taught in the windshear training exercises. Rather than being simply the selection of the incorrect procedure, the plan was creative in the sense that it entailed an impromptu combination of a standard missed approach adapted to attempt to skirt the weather cell with triggering cues for a microburst escape procedure. The plan as briefed was accepted by the first officer as the pilot-flying—a point at which the plan might have been questioned and revised.
Navigation
Published in Suzanne K. Kearns, Fundamentals of International Aviation, 2018
If the pilot gets close to the airport, but the weather is too poor for a safe landing, the pilot may reach a predetermined missed approach point. This is a specific distance from the runway where it is expected the pilot should be able to see the runway. If the pilot reaches the missed approach point and has no visual contact, he or she must initiate a missed approach: climb, circle the airport, and attempt the landing again (or divert to an alternate airport). As long as the pilot can see the runway before reaching the missed approach point, the aircraft can descend and land at the airport.
Pilots’ mental workload variation when taking a risk in a flight scenario: a study based on flight simulator experiments
Published in International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics, 2023
Lei Wang, Shan Gao, Wei Tan, Jingyi Zhang
Before the experiment started, each participant read and signed an informed consent statement and was briefed on the task of this experiment: performing a flight under low visibility without the limitation of autopilot. They were not informed of the real purpose, and we aimed to observe pilots’ decision-making that reflects their natural response. They then put on the PPG device with assistance from the researchers. After finishing the approach briefing and recording their stable HRV variables, the experiment of about 7 min approach began. Participants usually cut off the autopilot and used a manual airplane to continue the final approach (about 152.40 m [500 ft]). If pilots chose to perform a go-around, we requested them to obey the missed approach procedure. The experiment finished immediately. If they decided to land, the experiment ended after they touched down and the scene was frozen. The experiment lasted about 10 min. They then subsequently spent about 10 min completing the risk perception scale and providing their demographic information.
Does Specific Flight Experience Matter? The Relations Between Flight Experience of Commercial Aviation Aircrews and Missed Approach Incidents
Published in The International Journal of Aerospace Psychology, 2020
A Missed approach maneuver is a demanding situation where pilots, even experienced ones, might make inappropriate decisions and err. Previously, we analyzed 59 official safety reports during the years 1990–2014 including 65 MAP unsafe incident events as shown in Table A1. We identified two types of pilot errors that were very common across these events. The first was a late decision to abort landing and initiate a missed approach procedure (MAP: i.e., go around), and the second was inappropriate handling of the airplane in the vertical plane maneuver (Limor & Borowsky, 2016). Thus, in spite of the key role that automation plays in aviation in reducing pilots’ mental workload and improving safety, evidence shows that the portion of aviation accidents attributed to human error remains significant (Nagel, 1988; O’Hare, Wiggins, Batt, & Morrison, 1994; Wiegmann & Shappell, 2001; Yacavone, 1993). Several possible explanations were given to this apparent contradiction. The most common explanation is that while automation is very helpful, there are yet mentally demanding situations that may result in pilots’ error (Wilson, 2002). One of these demanding situations is MAP events. A survey, conducted by the French authority for safety investigations in civil aviation, the BEA (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyze pour la sécurité de l’aviation civile) showed that pilots experienced difficulties in handling MAP situations due to two major factors: (1) limited amount of time during which many tasks should be performed. (2) The need to manage, often under stressful circumstances, numerous elements in a rapidly changing situation (BEA, 2013).