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Pre-modern madness
Published in Vivienne Lo, Michael Stanley-Baker, Dolly Yang, Routledge Handbook of Chinese Medicine, 2022
In English, the term ‘madness’ often refers to various kinds of insanity. In addition to foolishness, enthusiasm and uncontrollable emotions in colloquial usages, it also refers to melancholy, mania, hysteria, hypochondria, neurasthenia, psychosis and a wide range of ‘mental illness’ that have been identified through time in the medical realm (Foucault 1964; Scull 2015).
The Psychiatric Perspective
Published in Bernat-N. Tiffon, Atlas of Forensic and Criminal Psychology, 2022
It is therefore of paramount importance that we have books like the one you hold in your hands; books that offer clear, concise and up-to-date knowledge from key fields of forensic psychiatry and psychology. It is thanks to the tremendous quality of books like this one by Bernat-N. Tiffon that specialists are given the honor of “being the eyes and ears of the Judge”. Having the best possible knowledge of the facts allows us to ensure the utmost diligence expected in the most arduous field of mental health, where our efforts to define sanity and insanity are tested at a crime scene where someone has been killed.
Criminal Responsibility and Deception
Published in Harold V. Hall, Joseph G. Poirier, Detecting Malingering and Deception, 2020
Harold V. Hall, Joseph G. Poirier
There are varying definitions of legal insanity in the state and federal jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions will excuse criminal behavior if it is the product of a mental disorder; others require that the perpetrator, at the time of the offense, was so mentally impaired that he could not appreciate the criminality of his conduct or could not conform his conduct to the requirements of law; and a few require that the accused could not tell the difference between right and wrong in regard to the criminal act. At least one state holds that a person’s criminal behavior will be excused only if it was the result of a “delusional compulsion,” which overpowered the will of the perpetrator. Shapiro (1999) summarized the impact of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, which followed the furor over the not guilty by reason of insanity defense of John Hinckley in 1982. A year earlier, Mr. Hinckley attempted the assassination of President Reagan. The Act is the requirement in federal courts and has also been incorporated into the statutory codes of several states.
National Strategies to Reduce the Use of Coercive Measures in Psychiatry in Denmark – A Review of Two Decades of Initiatives
Published in Issues in Mental Health Nursing, 2023
Lene Lauge Berring, Jesper Bak, Jacob Christian Hvidhjelm
The first Danish national legislation, known as “the insanity law,” was passed in 1938. This law regulated forced admission and detention and created the possibility of forced admission (Lov om sindssyge Personers Hospitalshold. (* 1), 1938). A second national law was passed in 1954. One of the most significant changes in the second law was the introduction of a complaint system, which was designed so that appeals could be made to the Ministry of Justice regarding forced admission and involuntary detention in a psychiatric department and with access to a subsequent judicial review. In 1989, a third national law was passed. The term “insanity” was replaced by “mental illness” This law is known as the “Law on Detention and Other Coercion in Psychiatry”. The purpose of this law was to establish rules for all types of coercive measures, strengthen patients’ human rights, and reduce the use of coercion. Furthermore, national registration was introduced for the use of coercive measures, and a system for handling complaints about coercion in psychiatry was established (Psykiatriloven, 1989). The law was subsequently revised in 1998 (Psykiatriloven, 1998).
Detecting Coached Feigning of Schizophrenia with the Inventory of Problems – 29 (IOP-29) and Its Memory Module (IOP-M): A Simulation Study on a French Community Sample
Published in International Journal of Forensic Mental Health, 2022
Ingrid Banovic, Federica Filippi, Donald J. Viglione, Fabrizio Scrima, Alessandro Zennaro, Angelo Zappalà, Luciano Giromini
Currently, forensic experts practicing in France may rely on a number of instruments to reach these goal. For instance, the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory–2 Restructured Form (MMPI–RF; Ben-Porath & Tellegen, 2008) has an official French translation, and various PVTs such as the TOMM could be safely used with French speaking individuals as they are not linguistically based. Additionally, a new SVT named the Self-Reported Symptom Inventory (SRSI; Merten et al., 2016) has been recently translated into French and tested with a sample of French speaking participants (Geurten et al., 2018). Nevertheless, when dealing with the credibility of symptoms presented by individuals claiming to be not guilty by reason of insanity or guilty but insane or mentally ill, one needs to keep in mind that these cases typically involve severe disorders and impairment and often serious psychotic or psychotic-like conditions (Resnick & Knoll, 2018). In these settings, it may not be realistic to administer more than one lengthy multiscale personality inventories such as the MMPI is, and often even one is just too much. As such, using a short SVT like the 29 item IOP-29 and a PVT like the 34 item IOP-M would likely be beneficial.
Integrating Neuroscience in Criminal Law: The Dutch Situation as an Example
Published in International Journal of Forensic Mental Health, 2019
Lucas Noyon, Michiel J. F. van der Wolf, Paul A. M. Mevis, Hjalmar J. C. van Marle
Not only the nuanced responsibility doctrine separates the Dutch framework for culpability from that used in Anglo-American common law jurisdictions. In the Netherlands “mens rea” is acknowledged to have both a descriptive meaning—the fault element of an offense, for example intent—and a normative meaning—blameworthiness. In this system “insanity”—or the lack of criminal responsibility due to a mental disorder—is seen as an excuse negating the blameworthiness of the offense. Through this system it can easily be explained that insanity does not generally lead to a complete lack of mens rea, as for example the element of “intent” can usually still be fulfilled: mentally disordered can act intentional yet not be blameworthy (Keiler & Roef, 2015). The fact that it is more of a normative concept than a description of impaired cognition or capability allows judges for more leeway to incorporate all sorts of relevant arguments into the act of establishing the degree of responsibility—including for example the consequences for sanctioning. Theoretically, both the normative and the dimensional character of the criminal responsibility doctrine seem to render it open towards integrating neuroscientific information.