Explore chapters and articles related to this topic
System identification methods for aircraft flight control development and validation
Published in Mark B. Tischler, Advances in Aircraft Flight Control, 2018
Modern fly-by-wire aircraft employ high-bandwidth digital flight control systems to achieve greatly increased agility and disturbance rejection across a significantly widened operational flight envelope as compared with the older generation of aircraft. The flight control includes complex feedback and feedforward shaping and advanced control moment devices that profoundly alter the bare- airframe characteristics and invalidate the classical stability and control modeling concepts and testing methods. For example, modern combat aircraft achieve independent pitch pointing and flight path control with direct lift devices and vectored thrust, rather than the coupled attitude-path response to elevator for conventional aircraft. This capability greatly enhances weapon pointing and air-to-air combat maneuvering. Another common feature of advanced aircraft is sidestick controllers which reduce weight, space and cockpit complexity compared to standard center sticks. Classical static stick-stability testing is an invalid method for determining speed stability since the side sticks possess automatic trimming at neutral stick position and feedback loops provide the required stability independent of the trim gradient.
Displays and Controls
Published in Frank H Hawkins, Harry W Orlady, Human Factors in Flight, 2017
Frank H Hawkins, Harry W Orlady
Future flight deck design development may give the keyboard a more prominent role and a more favourable location. This becomes possible with the introduction of the side-stick controller and is illustrated in the so-called ‘Pilot’s Desk Flight Station’, a concept developed by the Lockheed-Georgia Company and NASA (Sexton, 1983). This looks more like a computer operator’s console rather than a conventional pilot’s flight station. The Airbus A320 utilises both a side-stick controller and what is essentially a fixed position throttle that requires only pressure to modify engine output. While these features (especially the loss of cues from having a throttle that moves traditionally) have proved quite controversial, it must be admitted that most pilots who fly these aircraft, like them very much.
Language and Communication
Published in Christopher D. Wickens, Justin G. Hollands, Simon. Banbury, Raja. Parasuraman, Engineering Psychology and Human Performance, 2015
Christopher D. Wickens, Justin G. Hollands, Simon. Banbury, Raja. Parasuraman
To the extent that this shared knowledge facilitates communications, changes in the physical configuration of the workspace can affect team performance. For example, the repositioning of flight controls from their position in front of the pilot to the side (the so-called side-stick controller used on some modern aircraft) reduces the amount of shared knowledge about control activity between the pilot and copilot since the control activity of one can no longer be easily seen by the other (Segal, 1995). Conversely, the central and shared location of the engine thrust levers in the cockpit allows both pilots to develop and share their understanding of which pilot has control (and when) of the thrust levers using, in part, actual physical contact with the levers (Nevile, 2002). The advances of modern technology, in which spatially distributed dials and keys may be replaced by centralized displays and keyboards, may also inhibit the shared knowledge of action by reducing both the amount of head and hand movement that can be seen by the coworker (Wiener, 1989).
Flying by Feeling: Communicating Flight Envelope Protection through Haptic Feedback
Published in International Journal of Human–Computer Interaction, 2021
Dirk Van Baelen, M. M. (René) van Paassen, Joost Ellerbroek, David A. Abbink, Max Mulder
Lack of automation mode awareness was a contributing factor for the Air France 447 accident in which the aircraft reverted to a less stringent protection system due to a sensor failure. Surprised by the high altitude dynamics of the Airbus A330 aircraft and confused about the active flight envelope protection modes, the pilots incorrectly assessed that they were in a high speed situation and pulled back on the side stick, not realizing that this placed them into a stall which was only communicated to the pilots with an aural warning, initially masked by a master caution warning. The accident report indicates that this aural warning should be complemented which would provide the crew with additional information to enable them to escape from an erroneous understanding of the situation (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de l’aviation Civile, 2012). In another case, Air Asia 8501, the Airbus A320 rudder limiter malfunction and subsequent actions of the pilots resulted in a degraded protection mode which disengaged the autopilot. It took the pilots nine seconds before a correcting action was inputted, in which time the aircraft had reached a bank of 54. Their lack of actions resulted in extreme bank angles and a prolonged stall. Unfortunately, this flight also crashed, causing loss of all crew and passengers (Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi, 2015). If the pilots are informed about the approach to the limits during the initial moments, similar accidents can be avoided. Both aircraft, the A330 and A320, have a computerized system providing flight envelope protection, and a passive control device.