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Software Quality Assurance
Published in Leanna Rierson, Developing Safety-Critical Software, 2017
Although DO-178C requires an SQA process, it should be noted that quality is not solely the responsibility of the SQA personnel. Additionally, software quality cannot just be assessed at the end of the project, as it is for some engineering disciplines. As William Lewis notes: “Quality cannot be achieved by assessing an already completed product. The aim, therefore, is to prevent quality defects or deficiencies in the first place, and to make the products assessable by quality assurance measures …In addition to product assessments, process assessments are essential to a quality management program” [6]. Emanuel Baker and Matthew Fisher echo the sentiment: “While evaluation activities are essential activities, they alone will not achieve the specified quality. That is, product quality cannot be evaluated (tested, audited, analyzed, measured, or inspected) into the product. Quality can only be ‘built in’ during the development process” [3]. Quality is an ongoing process and is the responsibil ity of the entire software team. DO-178C encourages quality through the use of standards and verification activities throughout the software life cycle. Quality must be built in—it cannot be audited in, policed in, or tested in.
SysML-based compositional verification and safety analysis for safety-critical cyber-physical systems
Published in Connection Science, 2022
Jian Xie, Wenan Tan, Zhibin Yang, Shuming Li, Linquan Xing, Zhiqiu Huang
Safety-critical cyber-physical systems (SC-CPS) are complex systems often combining physical and mechanical components, networking and software (Mo et al., 2014; Varghese & Thampi, 2020). There are many well-known examples in different domains such as aircraft flight control, space missions, and nuclear systems. These systems are always designed with the properties such as high safety, high reliability, and strong real-time. Currently, Model-Driven Development (MDD) (Hause & Thom, 2007; Yu et al., 2020) is generally accepted as a key enabler for the design of SC-CPS. For example, in the guidance of civil avionics software certification DO-178C (Brosgol, 2011; DO-178C, 2011; Tim King & Bill Stclair, 2012), MDD (DO-331) (SC-205, 2011b) and formal methods (DO-333) (SC-205, 2011a) are considered as vital technology supplements.