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Message Authentication Codes
Published in Jonathan Katz, Yehuda Lindell, Introduction to Modern Cryptography, 2020
CBC-MAC vs. CBC-mode encryption. Basic CBC-MAC is similar to the CBC mode of operation. There are, however, some important differences: CBC-mode encryption uses a random IV and this is crucial for security. In contrast, CBC-MAC uses no IV (alternately, it can be viewed as using the fixed value IV = 0n) and this is also crucial for security. Specifically, CBC-MAC using a random IV is not secure.In CBC-mode encryption all intermediate values ti (called ci in the case of CBC-mode encryption) are output by the encryption algorithm as part of the ciphertext, whereas in CBC-MAC only the final block is output as the tag. If CBC-MAC is modified to output all the {ti} obtained during the course of the computation then it is no longer secure.
Wireless Security Wi-Fi
Published in Ali Youssef, Douglas McDonald II, Jon Linton, Bob Zemke, Aaron Earle, Wi-Fi Enabled Healthcare, 2014
Ali Youssef, Douglas McDonald II, Jon Linton, Bob Zemke, Aaron Earle
Advance Encryption Standard (AES) can be applied in many different ways. The way that the 802.11i standard has chosen AES is with CCMP, which is based on CBC-Message Authentication Code. It was chosen for data integrity and authentication with the Message Authentication Code (MAC) providing the same functionality as Message Integrity Check (MIC) used for TKIP. Before we can get into CCMP, we need to look at AES and some of its modes. The first term is CTR; this is AES in counter mode. This mode is used for confidentiality. The next mode is called CBC-MAC, which stands for cipher block chaining message authentication mode. This mode is used for integrity. AES also has combined CTR and CBC-MAC to create CCM. CCM stands for CTR/CBC-MAC mode of AES that incorporates both the confidentially of CTR and the integrity of CBC-MAC.
Analysis of Threats to WiMAX/802.16 Security
Published in Yan Zhang, Hsiao-Hwa Chen, Mobile Wimax, 2007
Michel Barbeau, Christine Laurendeau
The format of the MAC PDU payload is depicted in Figure 15.5. When applicable, before encryption, each packet is given a unique identifier as a new four-byte packet number which is increased from one data unit to another. Note that, for the sake of uniqueness, there are separate ranges of values for the uplink and downlink packets. The IEEE 802.16e standard uses Data Encryption Standard (DES) in the CBC mode or advanced encryption standard (AES) in the CCM mode to encrypt the payload of MAC PDUs. This standard introduces an integrity protection mechanism for data traffic which did not previously exist. CBC-MAC (as a component of AES-CCM) is used to protect the integrity of the payload of MAC data units.
A 40-nm low-power WiFi SoC with clock gating and power management strategy
Published in International Journal of Electronics, 2023
Han Su, Jianbin Liu, Yanfeng Jiang
With the plentiful peripheral interfaces, the SoC can be applied to generic low power IoT loggers, video streaming from camera, OTT devices, WiFi-enabled speech recognition devices, smart power plugs, home automation, industrial wireless control, proximity and movement monitoring trigger devices and many other controllable devices around us. In terms of security aspect, cryptographic hardware accelerations like advanced encryption standard (AES) and random number generator (RNG), eFuse encryption and IEEE 802.11 standard security features including counter CBC-MAC protocol (CCMP) and wireless LAN authentication and privacy infrastructure (WPA/WPA2) are all supported on the proposed SoC. With the multiple features, the security of the chip can be ensured well. Meanwhile, with presented power management resolution, the power problem can be well settled.
Data provenance collection and security in a distributed environment: a survey
Published in International Journal of Computers and Applications, 2021
Wolali Ametepe, Changda Wang, Selasi Kwame Ocansey, Xiaowei Li, Fida Hussain
In the MAC-based provenance scheme [52], which is known as MP, the sequence number integrity is ensured through message authentication codes (MAC). Here we consider a cipher block chaining message authentication code (CBC-MAC) with a node ID together as a provenance of a data. With this, the source of data has an original value where every generated block depends on its preceding block in the chain of the block and the existing node's ID in the packet path. Due to this interdependency, if any changes occur on any of the blocks in the provenance chain, it provokes the final block to also change. The provenance size upsurges by 6 bytes at each hop when TinySec library [54] is used to compute a 4-bytes CBC-MAC in the situation where the node ID is 2 bytes.