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Simulation
Published in Michael W. Carter, Camille C. Price, Ghaith Rabadi, Operations Research, 2018
Michael W. Carter, Camille C. Price, Ghaith Rabadi
There is a trade-off between how generic and how detailed a model can be; the more detailed the requirements are, the less generic the model will be. In this application of DES, however, RLVs have common core processes that do not deviate drastically from each other, and a generic model can account for variant designs. For example, in case of the Space Shuttle, the solid rocket boosters, which are one of the FHEs, fall into the ocean after they burn out and then they go through a retrieval process. On the other hand, if a new RLV concept uses boosters that fly back on their own as a hypothetical example, we can still consider that there is a retrieval process but it uses different times and resources (instead of falling into the ocean and taking certain amount of time for divers to retrieve them, they land on a runway and take a different amount of time and resources for example).
Mission control management: the principles of high performance and perfect decision-making learned from leading at NASA
Published in International Journal of General Systems, 2018
Two accidents discussed in part two are the destruction of Space Shuttle Challenger shortly after launch in 1986, and the equally tragic loss of Shuttle Columbia years later, just minutes before landing. Regarding Challenger, hot gases leaking through an O-ring housing on the Solid Rocket Booster ignited an external fuel tank. Air temperature that fateful morning was 36 degrees F, Challenger ominously wreathed in icicles before lift-off. O-ring manufacturer Morton-Thiokol recommended a minimum temperature of 53 F, but in a confrontational meeting Thiokol engineers admitted they could not prove “beyond a shadow of a doubt” that it was not safe to launch. A frank answer to the wrong question.
A dynamic model of managerial response to grey swan events in supply networks
Published in International Journal of Production Research, 2018
Henk A. Akkermans, Luk N. Van Wassenhove
Our notion of managerial preparedness thereby becomes linked with the management theory concepts of situational awareness (Endsley 1995), organisational mindfulness and high reliability organising (Weick and Sutcliffe 2001, 2006). All these concepts share a key warning against the dangers of ‘thoughtless, faulty, uncontrolled thinking’ Weick and Sutcliffe 2006, 517). We refer to Vaughan’s (1996) finding in the Challenger shuttle disaster that launch routines at NASA were preserved when anomalies produced by inadequate solid rocket booster seals, were normalised as acceptable deviations that fitted within pre-existing routines. (Vaughan 1996, 46, 47).