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Analysis and Conclusions
Published in Steven D. Jaffe, Airspace Closure and Civil Aviation, 2016
The purest form of airspace closure is the enforcement of a no-fly zone. These have usually been implemented during armed conflict and enforced by the dominant military power. The Coalition forces, led by the United States, effectively enforced two no-fly zones over Iraq from the first Gulf War in 1991 until the outbreak of the second Gulf War in 2003. The Coalition's overwhelming air superiority rendered any Iraqi air defense measures largely meaningless. NATO's Operation Deny Flight imposed a no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1993 to 1995, and on a smaller scale, Israel established a no-fly zone over Lebanon during the 2006 war. The Israeli Air Force had no trouble enforcing the zone, given the effective absence of a Lebanese air force and the country's small size.
Team Performance in Air Combat: A Teamwork Perspective
Published in The International Journal of Aerospace Psychology, 2023
Heikki Mansikka, Kai Virtanen, Don Harris, Juha Järvinen
The inputs for the process phase are comprised of the flight members’ cognitive and perceptual capabilities and competencies (e.g., tactical knowledge held in pilots’ long-term memories), the cognitive emergent states of the flight (TSA and transactive memory, which will serve to direct their attention), and the products of the perception stage. During the perception stage, the flight members survey the air combat environment using their on-board sensors, tactical datalink, visual observations and received radio transmissions. As the pilots communicate their observations about, e.g., positions and activity of the enemy aircraft, they use the orient taskwork competency to build and maintain both transactive memory and TSA levels 1–3 (Endsley, 1995; Mansikka et al., 2020). In its simplest form, the pilots orient by sharing their observations (TSA level 1). In addition, they strive to orient by disseminating, exchanging and comparing their knowledge of its meaning (TSA level 2) and the future states (TSA level 3) of those observations. The orient competency has its roots in the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act- (OODA) loop (see, e.g., Bryant, 2006; Endsley & Jones, 1997) and is essentially a synonym for situation assessment (Salmon et al., 2008). It has been argued that the process of situation assessment is a precursor to situation awareness, which is itself the precursor to decision-making (Prince & Salas, 1997). Based on the flight’s transactive memory and TSA, the pilots utilize a trigger competency to recognize events which require decision-making and response selection activities (Symons et al., 2006). A radar detection of an enemy aircraft arriving at a certain range from the flight, a visual detection of a surface-to-air missile launch or a radio call of an unidentified aircraft entering into a no-fly zone are typical events which trigger tactical decision-making. In a sense, observations, orient and trigger competencies and the cognitive emergent states form a fast paced perceptual cycle (Neisser, 1976; Plant & Stanton, 2015) which the flight maintains as it prepares to initiate a process of tactical decision-making.