Objections to the Basic Moral Status of Human Embryos
Christopher Kaczor in The Ethics of Abortion, 2023
Now, how one analyzes these three cases, Martin, Star Trek, and Shrunk, and whether they are all properly called fusions, will depend in part on what one believes about the relationship of body and soul, matter and spirit, or personality and corporality. The same is true for how one analyzes cases of embryo fusion (and twinning). Perhaps two psyches can use one body, temporarily or permanently. Perhaps two human beings cease to exist and a third comes into existence from the materials of the first two. Perhaps one human being dies and nourishes the other who survives. Whatever one's view of the “mind/body problem” and how to understand the identity of the being arising from these cases of fusion, one thing is clear: in all three examples, two persons were present before fusion. Martin, Star Trek, and Shrunk all show that the fusion of two into one does not in any way logically imply that there were not really two independent human beings prior to fusion. Since adult human beings could fuse with one another without logical contradiction, and no one doubts their humanity or personhood, it follows that human personhood is completely unrelated to the potentiality to fuse.
The soul
Peter Hutton, Ravi Mahajan, Allan Kellehear in Death, Religion and Law, 2019
Because of its central importance, this chapter has reviewed a sample of arguments used to try to prove and disprove the existence and character of the soul for over 2,000 years. The soul–mind–body problem continues onwards as theologians and scientists try to analyse the subjective experience we call reality which is created by our brains from sense perception. Not to all, but to most religions and believers, a soul or some sort of eternal spirit is central to their faith. Ultimately, whatever arguments are used, both for and against its existence, none is conclusive: the essence of the soul remains as elusive as ever unless one possesses belief – one way or the other. Perhaps the very last word on the subject should again go to Haldane who, as an atheist, when answering the question as to what would happen to him after death nevertheless concluded: ‘A man who is honest with himself can only answer, “I do not know”.’33
The Psychiatric Body
Roger Cooter, John Pickstone in Medicine in the Twentieth Century, 2020
At present, a new somatic style dominates. Biological psychiatry has altered almost beyond recognition the science and therapeutics of mental illness. It sustains an international research enterprise, and it consumes immense intellectual, professional, and governmental resources. Some participants believe it represents the definitive and presumably unchanging model of the human mind. The biopsychiatric program appears to be realizing the neophrenological dream of linking mental behaviors with events that are localizable in the brain; in its grander moments, it claims to have answered formidable metaphysical quandaries, like the mind-body problem, that have eluded the foremost thinkers of the past. Only time will test these assertions. This much, however, is certain: at the outset of the twenty-first century, the power, promise, and problems of modern psychiatry are great. For precisely this reason it is imperative to have an historically informed psychiatric profession and a biomedically enlightened public.
Neuroethics, Consciousness and Death: Where Objective Knowledge Meets Subjective Experience
Published in AJOB Neuroscience, 2022
Alberto Molina-Pérez, Anne Dalle Ave
The idea that consciousness depends on and/or is caused by brain activity is neither an empirical fact or a scientific theory, but a premise or working hypothesis, i.e. something that is held to be true and that makes it possible to study consciousness within the methodological framework of contemporary neuroscience. This idea may partially be rooted in the debate on the mind-body problem within the Western philosophical tradition. Therefore, revision proposals of the brain criterion of death, focusing on the cessation of spontaneous breathing and capacity for consciousness, appear to be based on a culturally charged conception of consciousness, the self, and their relationship to the brain. Clinicians have unquestionable expertise in their judgments about human physiology, but they are arguably less authoritative when it comes to issues and concepts that are also philosophical in nature (Rodríguez-Arias et al. 2020).
Why Bioethics Should Be Concerned With Medically Unexplained Symptoms
Published in The American Journal of Bioethics, 2018
Philosophically speaking, this kind of thinking is mistaken, and the error has profound ramifications for patients’ access to biological care. Nondualistic philosophers of every stripe accept without concern that we can retain language that sharply distinguishes the mental and the biological as long as we focus our attention on developing ways to make sense of that kind of talk philosophically in the end of the day. In fact, philosophical debate about the mind–body problem absolutely requires consistency with the sharp duality that distinguishes brain states from mental states. As far as philosophy is concerned, vagueness about the line between the biological and the psychosocial is not just unnecessary. If we cultivate this vagueness we make it impossible to address mind–body challenges in a philosophically coherent way.
Some Reflections on the Importance of Philosophy to Bioethics
Published in The American Journal of Bioethics, 2022
What should constitute sufficient evidence that AI has become sentient? It is hard enough to determine when fetuses achieve sentience despite the fact that they are members of our species. It is very hard to determine how far sentience extends in the animal kingdom—for example, evidence regarding crustaceans is mixed—yet other animals share much of our biology and occupy parts of a single terrestrial evolutionary story that includes us. With future robots and other AI systems, or at least those that (unlike “biobots”) do not include human neural tissue, our attempts to attribute or deny sentience will be deprived of considerations of common biology, including neurophysiology, and natural selection. How to advance responsible attributions in this domain take us directly to the classic mind/body problem: how mind emerges out of material substance. These questions cannot be well addressed if philosophy sits on the sidelines. Fortunately, philosophy is very much involved in the discussion as it develops. If the reader doubts that these issues concerning AI are of much interest to bioethics (as in “Where is the ‘bio’ here”?), presumably she will agree that how to make responsible attributions regarding the possible sentience of neural organoids is well within the domain of bioethics. Here, too, the questions are very difficult and defensible answers require contributions from philosophy.
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