An introduction to systems theory
David Kernick, Helen Bevan in Complexity and Healthcare Organization, 2018
Before turning to a description of systems approaches, it would be wise to remind ourselves of the nature of managerial systems (of which health management systems are archetypal) and the difficulties they present. In engineering and allied disciplines, much effort is spent in maintaining the illusion that systems (and by extension organizations) are orderly and rational, i.e. the consequences of alternative courses of action, given adequate data, can be predicted, allowing objective decisions to be made based on explicit values. Managed systems, however, are hybrid - they contain both system elements which are bureaucratic or algorithmic in nature and components where effect is less closely connected to cause.2-5 Due to limits in our information gathering and processing power, our ability to observe and predict is limited. In addition, the human components of the managed system cannot be guaranteed to behave in a way we would understand as rational. An example of this ‘bounded rationality’ is ‘satisficing’ behaviour6 where, rather than attempting to produce the rational best solution, we satisfy and suffice to meet a reasonable expectation. We may seek to discipline our own and others’ thinking onto the narrow path of logic, but we will fail.2
Sociomedical Models and the Epistemology of Risk: The Shortcomings of Medical Decision-Making Research
John T. Pardeck, Charles F. Longino, John W. Murphy in Reason and Rationality in Health and Human Services Delivery, 2014
The idea that rational decision-making, like computer reasoning, is a step-wise process of choosing among alternatives is a product of Herbert Simon's concept of bounded rationality. This idea has been influential among decision-making researchers examining self-protective behaviors prior to disasters and is becoming more influential in studies examining other health-related behaviors. The concept of bounded rationality implies that people are inherently deficient because they do not think probabilistically. To compensate, people make decisions using a variety of heuristics in order to reach a satisfactory goal. On the surface, this position may appear to be a new concept of reason, but on closer inspection the maximization principle held by value-expectancy theory is maintained even if it can never be achieved. Therefore, the practical decision-making described by bounded rationality is a rough approximation to this ideal (De Vany, 1996; Winograd & Flores, 1986).
Healthcare Politics
Kant Patel, Mark Rushefsky in Healthcare Politics and Policy in America, 2019
Incremental policymaking is politically attractive to policymakers because small policy adjustments reduce the impact of negative and politically risky consequences. Nevertheless, incremental policymaking can also inhibit imagination, innovation, and fresh new approaches to the solution of problems (Rosenbaum 1985). Policymakers end up creating policies aimed at “satisfying” diverse interests, rather than problem-solving. Herbert Simon (1957) first introduced the term “satisficing” to describe an outcome that is good enough. In other words, “satisficing” involves behavior that attempts to achieve some minimum level of a particular variable but does not strive to achieve its maximum possible value. He called this “bounded rationality.”
Moving From Understanding of Consent Conditions to Heuristics of Trust
Published in The American Journal of Bioethics, 2019
Michael M. Burgess, Kieran C. O’Doherty
In contrast to theorists who see heuristics as inferior forms of decision making, Gigerenzer and colleagues, drawing on the work of Herbert Simon, suggest that real-world settings require individuals to make decisions under conditions of limited information, time, and processing capacity (Gigerenzer 2008). Given these constraints, decision making often manifests “bounded rationality,” satisfying thresholds of acceptability given the constrains of time and effort in particular settings. Gigerenzer and Todd (2012) explicitly claim that this is not merely a descriptive account, but a normative one as well. “Ecological rationality” takes into consideration the suitability of the decision-making process for the particular environment. It is therefore not surprising that Beskow and Weinfurt report that experts were hesitant to dismiss as “failed” the decisions that did not live up to the demands of classical rationality. In the context of deciding to participate in biobanks or research, highly adaptive cognitive processes help us make good, but efficient, decisions based on our read of the situation.
Relations Between Lexical and Biological Perspectives on Personality: New Evidence Based on HEXACO and Affective Neuroscience Theory
Published in Journal of Personality Assessment, 2020
Goran Knežević, Ljiljana B. Lazarević, Christian Montag, Ken Davis
Based on the theoretical grounds and previous empirical evidence based on the B5 models, we expect to find substantial relations between the ANT emotional systems and HEXACO E, X, O, and A. The HEXACO model includes the H trait, which does not exist in the B5 model. This trait—entailing a sense of fairness—does not seem to reflect a primary emotional system. Like C, it also appears to reflect a more cerebral dimension. However, it should not be equated with the highly complex, uniquely human cognitive processes of moral reasoning. H might have much in common with the moral behavior understood as bounded rationality (Gigerenzer, 2010), assuming rudimentary cognitive processing such as imitate-your-peers, equality, tit-for-tat, and default heuristics. It was shown that this sense of fairness was present in nonhuman primates, which is nicely documented in the experiments with inequality aversion manifested by brown capuchin monkeys (e.g., Brosnan & de Waal, 2003, 2014). Therefore, similar to C, we do not expect the substantial correlations of H with any of the emotional systems but do expect moderate correlations with several of them. Small to moderate correlations are expected because H, as explained, does not reflect complex moral reasoning (expected to be unrelated to emotional systems) but rudimentary cognitive schemas having the characteristic of a trait-like tendency that is likely to be to a certain extent triggered by, facilitated, or some other way connected to the emotional systems such as CARE or ANGER. If this expectation proves to be correct it will be the second basic personality trait not corresponding to any of the primary emotional systems.
Applying theories to better understand socio-political challenges in implementing evidence-based work disability prevention strategies
Published in Disability and Rehabilitation, 2018
Christian Ståhl, Katia Costa-Black, Patrick Loisel
Policy-makers are restrictive in what information they consider when making decisions, where they tend to use information available to them, in relation to their past experiences, attitudes, ideology, emotions, and the cultural and political context [21]. Even in cases where the evidence is clear, the information is filtered through factors that influence the attention of a decision-maker. This bounded rationality explains the limits of decision-making, and that what is perceived as “rational” is highly dependent on the social and political context.
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