Safety management anno 2016
Erik Hollnagel in Safety-II in Practice, 2017
The second trend corresponds to composite linear thinking as represented by the Swiss cheese model. This safety paradigm proposes that adverse outcomes are due to a combination of adverse events and a failure of precautions, barriers, or defences. The solution is therefore to strengthen the barriers and defences, or to have multiple defences or defence-in-depth. As long as the causes involve physical movement or physical acts of some kind, physical and functional defences can be used with acceptable efficiency. But when the causes refer to decisions, choices, priorities, etc., or even to an organisations’ culture, the use of defences becomes a bit problematic since the barriers must be symbolic or incorporeal rather than physical and functional.
Cyberattack Mitigations During the Pandemic
Kenneth Okereafor in Cybersecurity in the COVID-19 Pandemic, 2021
A defense in-depth Cybersecurity model is the simultaneous application of several control measures to a single-valued asset to optimize efficacy. The control measures make up the defense in-depth approach work in a complementary manner, ensuring that at any time the asset is safeguarded by two or more layers of protection for maximum security.
System of Radiation Protection and Regulations in Radiation Oncology
K. N. Govinda Rajan in Radiation Safety in Radiation Oncology, 2017
A multilayer (defense in depth) system of protection shall be available in the equipment commensurate with the risk of potential exposure so that failure at one layer will prevent any radiation incident from occurring.
The influence of team workload on team performance in the light of task complexity: a study of nuclear fire brigades
Published in International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics, 2023
Veronika Klara Takacs, Marta Juhasz
Even less is known about the teamwork of ‘facility fire brigades’ as teams with a very specific, but crucial, service to provide. Facility fire brigades can be described as privately owned first responders who provide emergency service exclusively to one specific organization, such as nuclear power plants. Their job is to respond to fire alarms and medical emergencies on the plant site, to protect life and property as well as to participate in fire prevention and training. Once an unexpected situation occurs, team members are expected to complete different subtasks simultaneously and switch back and forth between different elements of the task [7]. In addition, when facing an unexpected event, teams are usually expected to interpret information from multiple sources and make decisions under non-routine, time-pressured, high-workload conditions [8]. While nuclear fire brigades show obvious similarities with municipal firefighters, there are some important differences that make their job unique (e.g., specific knowledge, equipment, rules and protocols, etc.), from which the most remarkable is the frequency and probability of real emergency situations to occur. Due to the application of the ‘defense in depth’ principle in fire safety of nuclear power plants [9], the probability of serious emergency situations is very low, meaning that nuclear fire brigades face a tremendous amount of stress and workload relatively rarely compared to municipal professionals.
Related Knowledge Centers
- Redundancy
- System Accident
- Nuclear Safety & Security