Controlled and Automatic Learning Processes in Addiction
Hanna Pickard, Serge H. Ahmed in The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy and Science of Addiction, 2019
Human and animal behaviour is purposeful in meeting biological needs. But the learning mechanisms underpinning behaviour cannot be deduced from simple observation. Behaviour may be governed by intentional decision making available to consciousness or by automatic learning processes below consciousness. Comparative psychology has long wrestled with the question of whether animals have a mental life or are mere automata that react to stimuli. The same question has been applied to addicts (Wise and Koob 2014). The dominant theory of addiction claims that drug-seeking is automatic, which explains why addiction persists despite heavy costs and the desire to quit. Yet craving is a core construct in addiction theory, suggesting that conscious desires play an important role. The controlled account of addiction is gaining ground, arguing that drug-seeking persists because addicts assign abnormally high value to the drug outweighing the costs, and they relapse despite reporting a desire to quit simply because they change their mind when priorities later change.
Phenomenology – questioning consciousness and experience
Kay Aranda in Critical Qualitative Health Research, 2020
Perhaps we can simply agree that: The world is known by the senses.The senses are known by the mind.The mind is known by Consciousness.And Consciousness is known by itself.When we search deep inside Consciousness,Consciousness searches deep inside us.
The Consciousness of Muscular Effort and Movement
Max R. Bennett in The Idea of Consciousness, 2020
Finally, the stage is reached during evolution when collaterals are used to generate sensations, independent of any sensory input to the brain, as in Figure 4.12D. The cerebral sentient loop is now independent of the environment, and the experience of a sensation involves a positive act of issuing an appropriate outgoing signal from the brain. According to Humphrey, sensing is not a passive act but involves participating in the act of ‘sentition’. That is, sensing involves the issuing of an appropriate outgoing signal from the brain; a signal which was, in its first evolutionary appearance, associated with the motor system only. It is this process which Humphrey claims to be consciousness. Since these commands can be issued without any trigger from the environment it is possible to have a rich ‘stream of consciousness’ that is generated from within the brain itself.
Leaving hypnosis behind?
Published in American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 2021
Out of this ferment, concluded Jaynes, emerged “consciousness as a social construction grounded by embodied sensorimotor experience and functionally structured by lexical metaphors and narrative practice” (Williams, 2011, p. 218). As Jaynes (1976) summarized: [C]onsciousness … operates by way of analogy, by way of constructing an analog space with an analog ‘I’ that can observe that space and move metaphorically in it. It operates on any reactivity, excerpts relevant aspects, narratizes [sic] and conciliates them together in a metaphorical space where such meanings can be manipulated like things in space. Conscious mind is a spatial analog of the world and mental acts are analogs of bodily acts. Consciousness operates only on objectively observable things. … [T]here is nothing in consciousness that is not an analog of something that was in behavior first. (pp. 65–66)
From Quantum Physics to Quantum Hypnosis: A Quantum Mind Perspective
Published in International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 2020
Consciousness is defined as a “quality of mind that is generally associated with subjective experience, self-awareness, feeling, cognition, free will and perception of relationships between us and our environment” (Edelman, 2005, p. 8). In consciousness research, there are “easy” and “hard” problems (Chalmers, 1996). The easy problem refers to the main functions of consciousness, such as attention, awareness, perception, feeling, and so on. Neural studies (both electrophysiological and neuroimaging) have provided neural correlates of discrete components of conscious experience (Edelman, 2005). The hard problem of consciousness is to explain ontological consciousness in terms of neural correlates (Chalmers, 1996). In a nutshell, the hard problem is explaining how the biological brain generates the subjective, inner world of experience. It is impossible to explain consciousness purely in terms of its neural correlates (Chalmers, 1996).
The use of virtual reality head-mounted displays within applied sport psychology
Published in Journal of Sport Psychology in Action, 2020
Consciousness of our surroundings is dependent on information acquired by our senses (Slater & Sanchez-Vives, 2016). Critical to VR HMDs is the capacity to replace real sense perceptions with computer-generated ones, allowing individuals to perceive actively through natural sensorimotor contingencies (Slater & Sanchez-Vives, 2016). The term presence refers to the perceptual illusion of being in the virtual environment (Slater, 2018). VR HMDs provide real-time updates of sensory perception, stereoscopic visuals, and wide fields of view to ensure that individuals experience the virtual environment as their primary reality (Won et al., 2017). A product of presence is that individuals behave in similar ways during a VR experience as they would in reality (Bailenson, 2018).
Related Knowledge Centers
- Awareness
- Cognition
- Introspection
- Perception
- Volition
- Metacognition
- Mind
- Thought
- Imagination
- Experience