Communicable diseases
Liam J. Donaldson, Paul D. Rutter in Donaldsons' Essential Public Health, 2017
The third influenza pandemic of the twentieth century came a decade later, in 1968–69. It was caused by a H3N2 subtype of the influenza A virus and was called Hong Kong influenza. The first isolation of the new virus in Britain was in August 1968. Throughout the autumn of 1968, and into the winter and spring of 1969, there were more cases and local outbreaks, but there was no large-scale epidemic in Britain in this first year. This was in marked contrast to the situation in the United States that same year, where there was a large epidemic with high attack rates and many deaths. North America was unusual compared with other temperate parts of the world in suffering a high impact from Hong Kong influenza during the winter of 1968–69. It was the following winter of 1969–70 that the virus caused major epidemics in Britain and other European countries. This pattern of spread was very different to the Asian influenza pandemic and illustrates how unpredictably influenza viruses behave.
From colony to global city
Milton J. Lewis, Kerrie L. MacPherson in Public Health in Asia and the Pacific, 2007
Finally, the ongoing avian influenza outbreak has the potential to cause severe socio-economic damage within the Asian region and a possible global human influenza pandemic continues to create fear about the potential effects on a global business centre like Singapore. The impact of diseases is also made more significant because of the interconnectivity of regional economies where the effect within one country could send shocks which affect other countries. The effects on critical services such as health care are also important because a pandemic can be expected to result in an enormous number of hospitalizations which will overwhelm the current health-care capacity of a small country such as Singapore. Policymakers in Singapore have thus drawn up various plans for dealing with emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases including disaster plans for influenza pandemics and bioterrorism. These plans have included not only the stockpiling of therapeutic agents but also establishing surveillance networks, barriers to entry, infection control and other public health measures.
Vaccines Against COVID-19
Hanadi Talal Ahmedah, Muhammad Riaz, Sagheer Ahmed, Marius Alexandru Moga in The Covid-19 Pandemic, 2023
Gavi’s board agreed to use IFFIm and prior market agreements to synergize the concept of vaccine production, development, and access [45]. The urgent need for vaccines against COVID-19 with an appropriate distribution within populations is essential around the globe. Vaccines should be a top priority for health care providers and other individuals who are at the front line to the risk of severe morbidities and mortalities. The financially active countries should not monopolize the supply of vaccines for COVID-19 around the globe. This risk was observed in the influenza pandemic in 2009. Most prosperous nations negotiated advanced orders for vaccines whereas, overcrowded developing countries remained un-accessed [46]. The consequences resulted in a sub-optimal distribution of an initially inadequate resource. The responsibility for healthier solution comes upon the government’s shoulders to ensure a fair allocation system around the world.
An overview of advancement in aptasensors for influenza detection
Published in Expert Review of Molecular Diagnostics, 2022
Varsha Gautam, Ramesh Kumar, Vinod Kumar Jain, Suman Nagpal
The influenza pandemic of 1918 (H1N1), Asian flu of 1957 (H2N2) and Hong Kong flu, of 1968 (H3N2), were three of the most significant outbreaks of influenza world widely during the 20th century [3]. The 2009–2010 flu season also caused a 21st century flu pandemic, which included the H1N1 virus, known as swine flu, as swines that were the primary host of viral infections [4]. About 60.8 million infected cases, 274,304 cases of hospitalization and 12,469 influenza-related deaths in 2009 were recorded in the United States. The virus was detected in geese in China for the first time in 1996 [5]. Asian H5N1 flu was first detected in humans in 1997 during a Hong Kong poultry outbreak, after which it was detected in the poultry and wild birds of more than 50 African, Asian, European, and Middle East countries [6]. About 861 human influenza A (H5N1) infections have been recorded in 17 countries from January 2003 to 26 March 2020 [7]. Some other cases with other variants referred to as ‘avian influenza 2’ or ‘zoonotic influenza’ viruses include (H5N6). (H7N4). (H7N9) have also been identified, but in smaller numbers [8,9].
Recommended hospital preparations for future cases and outbreaks of novel influenza viruses
Published in Expert Review of Respiratory Medicine, 2020
Seasonal influenza, in addition to periodic pandemics, is a major health burden with a significant morbidity and mortality. Epidemics of seasonal influenza occur in all parts of the world every year and an individual may build up some degree of immunity toward certain strains of influenza virus following repeated exposure with increased protection through influenza vaccinations. The background immunity will be lost when a novel influenza virus emerges through an antigenic shift or genetic reassortment leading to a pandemic. There have been 4 influenza pandemics since the 20th century: the Spanish Influenza in 1918–19 (an estimated 20–50 million deaths globally), the Asian Influenza in 1957–58 (1–4 million deaths globally), the Hong Kong Influenza in 1968–69 (1–4 million deaths worldwide) and the 2009 pandemic due to A(H1N1) (100,000–400,000 deaths worldwide). The estimated case fatality rates were 2–3%, <0.2%, <0.2% and 0.02% for the 4 pandemics, respectively [1].
Emergency Medical Services Personnel’s Pandemic Influenza Training Received and Willingness to Work during a Future Pandemic
Published in Prehospital Emergency Care, 2020
T. Rebmann, R. L. Charney, T. M. Loux, J. A. Turner, Y. S. Abbyad, M. Silvestros
This study found that more than ten percent of EMS personnel would not be willing to work during an influenza pandemic even if their employer required it. This finding has critical implications for healthcare surge capacity during a pandemic. Large and prolonged patient surges are anticipated during a future influenza pandemic, including high numbers of emergency department visits and hospital admissions occurring in waves lasting six to eight weeks (27). For example, during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, emergency department visits in U.S. hospitals doubled (28). EMS personnel will play an essential role in responding to and managing this patient surge as frontline workers providing prehospital healthcare services to those with urgent medical needs (29). Their willingness to work during an influenza pandemic would have significant implications for healthcare surge capacity in a community, including limiting prehospital care, extending wait times for emergency services, or forcing ill individuals to use public transportation—all of which could increase morbidity and mortality rates.
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